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It is time we started talking about Justice with a capital “J.” I’m a
survivor of the Trials of the Century. We have one almost every six
months in Los Angeles. From the Rodney King beating trial to the O.J.
Simpson murder trial to the late Michael Jackson’s molestation trial, I
saw them all. Yet, those cases did not teach me what our constitutional
rights really mean. That is something I only discovered by founding
Loyola Law School’s Project for the Innocent (LPI). In working to
exonerate the wrongfully convicted, I learned one of the most profound
lessons of our constitutional democracy – there is the justice you find in
the Constitution and the Justice you find in the adversarial system when
constitutional rights are put to the test.
Prior to teaching full time, I was a federal prosecutor in the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California. I certainly tried
to respect the constitutional rights of the defendants I prosecuted. The
basics were easy: no lying, stealing, cheating or withholding exculpatory
information. I believed that defense lawyers and judges were the
guardians of a defendant’s constitutional rights and that my role was, as
the prosecutor, at most peripheral. My job, so I believed, was to
represent the People and the victim. The person on the other side of the
courtroom was the “defendant.” My client was the “United States of
America.” In a fight, I knew on which side I stood.
Frankly, even after I left the federal prosecutor’s office, I still
tended to identify with the prosecution’s side of the ledger. At present, I
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have over 300 former students who have become prosecutors. When I
appear for legal commentary on television, I am frequently chyroned as,
“Former Federal Prosecutor.” That label became my professional
identity. It was easy for me to appear on television because I could
easily identify the prosecution’s strategy and defend it. And, as I did all
this, I thought of the Constitution as some type of wonderful historic
document that gave some general rules, like the Ten Commandments,
but whose rules did not really control what would happen in a case.
Those realities were controlled by who had the power. In most of the
cases, the prosecutor had the power to control the impact, if any, of
constitutional rights. If there was a problem with a search, for example,
the prosecutor could alter the impact of the defendant’s constitutional
rights on the case simply by making a quick plea bargain.
Yet, after more than thirty years, I have come to appreciate the
shortcomings in that basic approach to criminal justice. Five years ago,
inspired by my students, I started Loyola’s Project for the Innocent. For
decades, I have received a steady stream of letters from inmates in
prison and jail. I receive approximately four letters per day from
incarcerated individuals. Many of these are now evaluated by the
students in our Project. It was a rude awakening. No matter the
idealism with which we approach the criminal justice system, the stark
reality is that innocent people are convicted. Statistically, close to five
percent of all those convicted of a serious crime like murder or rape, are
probably innocent. Constitutional rights only go so far in protecting
society’s most vulnerable from wrongful conviction.
I have had my birds-eye view of justice by seeing it through the
eyes of my clients who have been exonerated after spending decades in
prison for wrongful convictions. They are good people, gentle people,
noble people, and grateful people. Despite the years they endured in
prison, they leave with no bitterness. Rather, they praise those who
helped them secure their freedom.
In this essay, I want to discuss why it is not enough to have blind
faith that the Constitution will ensure that only the guilty are convicted.
We need to do better. We need to realize that constitutional rights only
protect individuals if both prosecutors and defense lawyers want those
rights to work. A prosecutor who sees constitutional rights as a
technicality blasphemes the Constitution. A defense lawyer who lazily
disregards his or her duty to zealously defend a defendant does the same.
The Constitution is an empty promise without the commitment of
lawyers and judges charged with upholding defendants’ rights.
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I. INNOCENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: WE NEED TO DO BETTER
The failings of our criminal justice system are best told through the
cases of those who suffered by our failure to ensure that their
constitutional rights were protected. 1 While society tends to focus on
celebrity cases, the real story of our justice system lies with those whose
cases were handled outside of the limelight. They are the forgotten—at
least, until someone starts to take their constitutional rights seriously.
A. Obie Anthony
Consider the case of People v. Obie Anthony. 2 Mr. Anthony was
charged with a shooting outside of a brothel in South Central Los
1. There is an increasing body of literature detailing the stories of the wrongfully convicted.
See Zieva Dauber Konvisser, “What Happened to Me Can Happen to Anybody”–Women Exonerees
Speak Out, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 303 (2015); Russel Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of
Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013); James R. Acker & Catherine L.
Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in New York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73
ALB. L. REV. 1245 (2010). In addition to traditional law review articles, there are also on-line sites
dedicated to researching the causes, and telling the stories, of wrongful convictions. See National
Registry of Exonerations, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx,(last
visited April 17, 2017); Wrongful Conviction Blog, https://wrongfulconvictionsblog.org/
2017/03/07/national-registry-of-exonerations-releases-two-enlightening-reports (last visited April
17, 2017); American Public Media, After Innocence in America (2013), at
http://www.thestory.org/series/after-innocence-exoneration-america (last visited April 17, 2017).
2. For a more detailed description of Mr. Anthony’s case and the challenges for his postconviction proceedings, see Laurie L. Levenson, Post-Conviction Death Penalty Investigations: The
Need for Independent Investigators, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 225, 228-235 (2011). As outlined in that
article:
On March 27, 1994, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Felipe Gonzales, Victor Trejo, and
Luis Jimenez drove to a building at the corner of Figueroa and 49th Streets in Los Angeles so that Gonzales could see his “friend,” a female named either Melinda or Melissa.
John Jones managed the building on the corner and rented rooms for $10 a day to prostitutes and transients. There, Gonzales got out of the car while Trejo and Jimenez stayed
inside to clean up a beer Gonzales had spilled. Trejo then turned the car around and
pulled up alongside Gonzales, who was chatting with someone in front of the building.
As Gonzales walked toward the car, three African American males surrounded him. One
of the men grabbed Gonzales by the neck, pushed him up against Trejo’s car and hit him
in the face with a gun. One of the other men yelled, “Stop the fucking car,” opened the
passenger door, and said to Trejo and Jimenez, “Give me the money.” He had a silver
automatic gun tucked in his pants. As he grabbed Jimenez by the hair, Trejo claimed to
have seen his face, although the man did not even partially enter the car. Trejo grabbed
the man’s hand, telling him there would not be a problem. The man then shot both Trejo
and Jimenez numerous times, and Trejo drove off. As he was driving away, Trejo saw
Gonzales being pushed and trying to run, then he heard more shots but did not see anything further.
When the paramedics arrived at the crime scene, they found Gonzales lying in the street
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Angeles. Felipe Gonzales died at the scene, but no suspect was
apprehended. Instead, the Los Angeles Police Department began an
investigation of the case. In that investigation, the police relied heavily
on the owner of the brothel, John Jones, and his description of the
suspects. No physical evidence linked Mr. Anthony or his co-defendant,
Reginald Cole, to the shooting. However, according to Jones, a “Good
Samaritan” was able to shoot one of the suspects. Three weeks later, the
police arrested Obie Anthony and Reggie Cole. Cole had a bullet wound
in his leg. The only problem was that the wound was eight years old–a
detail that did not seem to bother the police.
Working backward from their theory that Cole and Anthony had
been involved in the shootings, the police engineered a case to be
presented to the jury. Jones would be a key witness. So would another
robbery victim at the scene, even though that individual had not been
able to identify either Cole or Anthony until right before trial, their faces
“came to him in a dream.”
Based upon Jones’ testimony and that of the so-called eyewitness,
Anthony and Cole were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
There they sat for seventeen years until their constitutional rights went
from mere words to keys to freedom.
When Loyola’s Project for the Innocent reinvestigated the case, we
quickly discovered that the Due Process Clause was given lip service at
trial. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant
the right to due process.3 Over the years, the Supreme Court has
developed a rich jurisprudence of what due process means for criminal
defendants. At its core, it means that a defendant must be given a fair
opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s evidence against him, not just
by cross-examining witnesses, but by providing defendants with the
information in the government’s possession that might assist the

on his stomach. They pronounced him dead on arrival at 11:41p.m. The medical examiner testified that Gonzales died of a through-and-through gunshot wound to the back.
When Detective Marcella Winn arrived at the scene at about 1:30 a.m., she found no
witnesses. At 4:00 a.m., as she was standing on the corner of 49th and Figueroa, John
Jones leaned out a second-floor window, said, “Pssst, officer, they ran that-a-way,” and
pointed eastward on 49th Street. After a few requests, Jones came downstairs and spoke
with Winn for about five minutes. No other witnesses came forward.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
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defense. 4 It also means that law enforcement should refrain from
creating and presenting false evidence. 5
In Anthony’s case, due process was jettisoned in several significant
ways. First, the prosecution did not disclose the sweet deal that John
Jones received in exchange for his testimony. Mr. Jones had his own
problems with the law. He had been charged with shooting the mother
of his child in the head as she held the baby. Prosecutors never
disclosed that Jones walked away with a probationary sentence on that
case because he was such a valued witness for the prosecution.
Prosecutors also did not reveal that another victim who was shot the
night of the murder, but survived, would not identify Anthony as one of
the shooters. That witness had been sent out of state by prosecutors and
was only located when LPI went knocking on the doors of people on the
south side of Chicago looking for him. When he came to California for
the habeas hearing, the prosecutors tried to rebound with a Perry Mason
moment. The prosecutor stood behind Mr. Anthony, with his hands on
his shoulders, and asked, “Is this the man who shot you?” Oblivious or
indifferent to the problems with such suggestive identification methods,
the prosecutor tried to salvage his case by asking for a one-on-one incourt identification. It seemed to be far from the prosecutor’s mind
whether such an approach even came close to the noble goal of fair
process for Mr. Anthony. Despite this suggestive attempt, the witness
stared at Anthony and answered the question, “no.”
It was at that moment that I realized that there is nothing wrong
with our Constitution. Thank God for our Constitution. The problem is
not with a 200-year-old document that says defendants should receive
due process. 6 The problem is that those charged with ensuring that the
Constitution plays a critical role in today’s trials continue to see it as
nothing more than an ancient document. Moreover, even when they
recognize that the Constitution guarantees Due Process, they don’t seem
4. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation consists of three elements.
First, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant, either because it is impeaching or
because it is exculpatory. Second, the State must have suppressed the evidence, either willfully or
unintentionally. Finally, the failure to disclose the evidence must have resulted in prejudice.
5. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). See also Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967)
(“More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state
criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. There has been no deviation
from this established principle.”). “A defendant has a due process right to a fair trial. Government
agents may not manufacture evidence and offer it against a criminal defendant.” Doswell v. City of
Pittsburgh, No. 07-0761, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51435,at 24 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2009) (quoting
Stepp v. Mangold, No. 94-2108, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8633, 1998 WL 309921, at 7 (E.D. Pa. June
10, 1998)).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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to consider that the Constitution sets a bare minimum for a fair trial. In
this day and age when we realize that wrongful conviction is a very real
phenomenon, prosecutors must recalibrate their sense of due process.
Due process is, in a very real sense, what we want it to be. If
prosecutors want to try and win with questionable identifications, 7 case
law probably won’t stand in their way. Similarly, if prosecutors want to
withhold disclosing evidence to the defense because they assess that the
information is insufficiently material, they might succeed with such
arguments in a post-conviction review. Finally, if prosecutors want to
pick and choose among percipient witnesses to give a distorted view to
the jury, they might be able to do that and throw the responsibility of
finding and calling such witnesses on the defense.
However, if prosecutors are truly invested in honoring the right to a
fair trial and sensitive to the fact that jurors often reach the wrong
verdict, their approach to due process might be different. They might
see their role less as an adversary and more as a partner in the search for
justice.
As it turned out, a reinvestigation of Anthony’s case revealed that
the likely shooter was someone on the roof of the brothel.
Coincidentally, that is a place John Jones would often frequent as he
took target practice from his building. A Los Angeles Times reporter
who shadowed the police investigation later revealed in his book, The
Killing Season, 8 that the roof was littered with so many bullet shell
casings that the reporter just pocketed some after the shooting.
There is nothing spelled out in the Constitution about pocketing
bullet shells, evaluating the credibility of pimps, or pursuing leads that
might be helpful to the defense. However, participants in the criminal
justice system have an opportunity to do better than rely on the
minimum due process standards that might protect against a reversal. To
do that, one must view the due process clause as an affirmative charge to
challenge the evidence, whether one is serving in the role of a prosecutor
or defense counsel.

7. As is now well established, erroneous eyewitness identifications play a role in
approximately 75 percent of all wrongful convictions. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM
DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 95 (2000).
8. MILES CORWIN, THE KILLING SEASON 25 (1st ed. 1997).
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B. Kash Register
Yes, Kash Register was our client’s name. And it was a good thing
that his mother gave him such a memorable name. Thirty-four years
after he was convicted of a murder he did not commit, it was that name
that saved him because it led to a witness coming forward to expose the
due process violations in Mr. Register’s case. 9
In 1979, an elderly white man was robbed and shot at close range.
The physical evidence at the scene did not establish Mr. Register as the
suspect. Nonetheless, he spent 34 years in prison for the crime. 10 The
reason was revealed years later when LPI discovered that the prosecutors
used witnesses who were obviously lying.
There were two so-called eyewitnesses in Mr. Register’s case. The
first, Brenda Anderson, lived in an apartment on the same street as the
shooting. On the day of the shooting, she was out stealing Avon
products left on people’s doorsteps. In exchange for her testimony, she
was not charged with that crime–a key piece of information prosecutors
failed to share with Mr. Register’s defense counsel. The police also did
not tell the prosecutor, so the prosecutor did not tell defense counsel, that
Brenda had told her older sister, Sheila Vanderkam, that she had only
seen the back of the shooter’s head. When Vanderkam, who worked as
a detective’s assistant at the police station, told the investigating
detective that her sister could not make the identification and was also
completely unreliable, 11 he responded by placing his finger over his lips
and saying, “ssshhh.”
The second witness was Elliott Singleton. He claimed that he had
been painting the house across the street from the victim’s house when
he saw the shooting. At trial, he testified that he left the apartment and
chased after the armed suspect for blocks. After about six blocks, the
man stopped and pointed the gun at him. According to Singleton, that is
when he got a good look at the robber, said, “I’m cool,” and then walked
9. The details of Mr. Register’s prosecution and exoneration can be found in an excellent
article, Lara Bazelon, A Mistake Has Been Made Here, and No One Wants to Correct It, SLATE,
Dec. 17, 2013, at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/
the_exoneration_of_kash_register_and_the_problem_of_false_eyewitness_testimony.html.
10. The fingerprints on the victim’s car did not match Register’s. The police never recovered
a wallet or a weapon. In a search of Register’s house, they found three brown caps, a pair of black
pin-striped pants, and a burgundy shirt, similar to the clothing one of the eyewitnesses said the
shooter was allegedly wearing. There was a speck of blood on the pants. DNA testing did not exist
in 1979, so the blood was simply found to be Type O, matching the victim, Register, and more than
3 million residents of Los Angeles. Bazelon, supra note 9.
11. Vanderkam described Anderson as smoking PCP so much that she became “unable to
remember day-to-day conversations, and [could] barely tie her shoes.” Id.
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away. Later, when interviewed LPI, Singleton denied ever seeing the
murder. Rather, he said the police had knocked on his door in an effort
to get his pregnant wife to testify. She, however, was never called as a
witness and an internal District Attorney memorandum showed that the
prosecutors did not have confidence in either witness.
Like Mr. Anthony, Mr. Register was not guilty of the shooting for
which he originally faced the death penalty and later served many years
on a life sentence. As in Mr. Anthony’s case, the prosecutors and police
in Mr. Register’s case abdicated their individual responsibility to ensure
due process by deferring to the jury’s assessment of the incomplete
evidence they were presented.
However, the difference between how the trial prosecutor saw due
process and how prosecutors should view due process was encapsulated
in one little act by the habeas prosecutor in the case. During the
proceedings, that prosecutor went back through all of the evidence that
the original prosecutor had and disclosed to habeas counsel the
memorandum revealing the problems with the prosecution’s witnesses.
He saw “materiality” through the eyes of a defense lawyer. He also
decided not to claim the memorandum was privileged or protected by
attorney work product. The habeas prosecutor recognized that the
essence of due process is not how little evidence prosecutors can get
away with disclosing, but how much evidence might actually help the
court discern the truth.
C. Lessons from the Trenches
Both Mr. Anthony’s and Mr. Register’s cases are flesh and blood
lessons about the Constitution. The Constitution provides a framework
for thinking about how to fairly handle cases. It is the responsibility of
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to make those concepts work.
Unfortunately, current law often perverts constitutional ideals.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Herrera v.
Collins. 12 In that case, Chief Justice William Rehnquist opined that the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment
would not prevent a defendant from being executed just because he is
actually innocent. Because actual innocence did not fit within the
12. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). See generally Larry May & Nancy Viner, Actual Innocence and
Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482 (2005) (“Denying actual innocence claims is a
paradigmatic example of manifest injustice and a denial of substantive due process.”); Bernard A.
Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL.
773, 776 (2002) (“Evidence of actual innocence discovered post-conviction establishes a prima
facie Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation.”).
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traditional framework for Eighth Amendment challenges and if a
defendant received a fair trial, his innocence did not control his
challenge. 13
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted that “the execution of a legally
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event,” 14 but she did not believe Herrera was innocent, primarily
because he received all of the protections of a jury trial. In his
concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia chastised the dissenters who had
claimed that the decision shocked the conscience. Justice Scalia wrote,
“If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely
approved) ‘shocks’ the dissenters’ consciences . . . perhaps they should
doubt the calibration of their consciences, or better still, the usefulness
of ‘conscience shocking’ as a legal test.” 15
By contrast, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, viewed the
operation of the Constitution quite differently. Blackmun wrote, “We
really are being asked to decide whether the Constitution forbids the
execution of a person who has been validly convicted and sentenced, but
who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered
evidence.” 16
For the Justices in the majority, the rigid application of established
doctrines is the proper way to use the Constitution. For the dissent, legal
tests may be important, but the ultimate goal and purpose of the
Constitution is to ensure that persons are treated fairly and to prevent
injustices.
When I went from being a prosecutor to the founder of an
innocence project, I had to recalibrate my conscience. I also had to
recalibrate my approach to the Constitution, especially the Due Process
Clause. I had not had the tools to do that recalibration in my role as a
prosecutor. Until one talks to an individual who has spent more than
half his life in prison for a crime he did not commit it is hard to have that
perspective.
II. CREATING PERSPECTIVE
In an adversarial system, there are ways to create the necessary
perspective for prosecutors to take a more majestic view of the
Constitution. First, coupling constitutional duties with aspirational
13.
14.
15.
16.

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 431.
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ethical duties can help serve this purpose. Accordingly, many states are
moving toward ethical rules that go beyond the strict Brady standard
established by the Supreme Court for post-conviction review. Instead of
having prosecutors determine how “material” evidence might be to the
defense, they are required to disclose all potentially exculpatory or
impeachment evidence. This ethical obligation is a constant reminder
that the prosecutor should not be using due process standards as a means
to limit a defendant’s access to evidence. Rather, the focus should be on
what steps can be taken to further ensure the defendant’s right to a fair
trial. 17
Second, perspective can be increased by having prosecutors take on
new roles that were not previously viewed as “prosecutorial.” In that
regard, dozens of prosecution offices in the United States have created
Conviction Integrity or Conviction Review units.18 The role of
prosecutors in these units is expressly to evaluate cases to see if there
were any shortfalls in the fairness of a defendant’s trial. Success is not
achieved by maintaining an unfair conviction; success results from
discovering and remedying any flaws in the criminal justice system.
Finally, perspective can be enhanced by acknowledging and being
open to discuss what constitutional rights should mean today, even if
they were defined differently in prior eras. 19 For example, before DNA
testing and comprehensive research on eyewitness identifications, the
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of eyewitness
testimony may have made sense. 20 After all, the best we could do at the
time was to look at all the circumstances to determine whether an
identification was likely fair and accurate. However, society has
progressed beyond that point. 21 We now know that there are significant
problems with such identifications and that a court which allows people

17. See Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem with Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a
Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 372-374 (2015); Dana
Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the Evaluation of Actual
Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613 (2014).
18. Levenson, Cynical Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 370-71; see also, Daniel Kroepsch,
Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs
are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095 (2016).
19. For an excellent history of the evolution of the study of wrongful convictions, see Jon B.
Gould & Richard A. Leo, Wrongful Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 825 (2010).
20. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
21. See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from
Social Science, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 19 (2009); Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can
Psychology Say about the Neil v. Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 347, 349-50 (1983).
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to testify to images that come to them in dreams, cannot be said to be
enhancing the chances of a fair trial. 22
In the end, to honor our Constitution, the best thing we can do is to
recognize that constitutional rights–as traditionally defined–are just a
starting point for ensuring a fair trial. It takes much more than that to
ensure Justice. And, most importantly, it takes people who care.
It is frustrating to hear a judge say, “I know the defendant is
probably innocent, but the jury has spoken.” Judges are extremely
reluctant to overturn a jury verdict because of the belief that trials are
sufficient to ensure due process. Yet, as anyone who has worked in the
criminal justice system can attest, what happens in the courtroom is
impacted enormously by what happens outside the courtroom, both
before and after trial.
The Constitution is not a straitjacket on those who want to see
justice. It must be a tool to help those who seek to prevent and remedy
injustice.
III. POSTSCRIPT
Following my remarks at Constitution Day, two more of our clients
were exonerated. Mr. Andrew Wilson, who spent thirty-two years in
prison, was released on March 15, 2017, because of a host of newly
discovered Brady violations and improper eyewitness examination
procedures. 23 Mr. Marco Contreras was released on March 28, 2017,
because the prosecutor conceded he was actually innocent and had been
misidentified by the key eyewitness. 24
The Constitution came alive for those defendants, in part, because
the newly formed Conviction Review Unit and the new head of the Los
Angeles District Attorney’s Habeas Litigation Unit took a fresh look at
what had happened in those cases. They put flesh and blood on the
framework of the Constitution. They sought Justice.

22. See Robert J. Norris, Catherine L. Bonventre, Allison D. Redlich & James R. Acker,
“Than That One Suffer”: Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 AL. B. L.
REV. 1301, 1314-15 (2010).
23. Andrew Wilson Freed After 32 Years in Prison, Innocence Project (Mar. 16, 2017), at
https://www.innocenceproject.org/andrew-wilson-released-after-32-years.
24. Marisa Gerber, Innocent Man Freed After Spending 20 Years Behind Bars for Attempted
Murder in a Compton Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow
/la-me-wrongful-conviction-20170328-story.html.

